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Trade Flows, Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Financial Depth: Evidence from 28
Emerging Countries
Abstract
We investigate the effects of real exchange rate uncertainty and financial depth
on manufactures exports from 28 emerging economies to the North and South over
1978–2005. We estimate a dynamic panel model using system GMM approach and
show that for the majority of countries in our sample exchange rate uncertainty
affects both South-South and South-North trade negatively. Furthermore, for
several cases we discover that this effect is unidirectional, that is South-South
or South-North. In addition, we find that while financial depth plays a trade-
enhancing role, exchange rate shocks can negate this effect. We also show that
trade among developing economies is likely to enhance export growth.
Keywords: Trade flows; Exchange rate uncertainty; South-South trade; Financial depth;
Dynamic panel data.
JEL Classification Numbers: F15; F31; G15; E44; O14
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1 INTRODUCTION
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system, researchers
studying the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows have arrived at mixed
conclusions. Theoretical models predict positive, negative or no effects depending on the
underlying assumptions. Although, the effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows
appears to be an empirical question, empirical research, too, yields mixed results based
on the specified model, uncertainty measures, sample period, frequency and aggregation
level of the data, and the countries considered.
A review of the empirical literature shows that researchers have predominantly fo-
cused on developed countries alone in their investigation on the linkages between trade
flows and exchange rate variability. Surprisingly, only few researchers used data from
developing countries and considered the idea that exchange rate uncertainty may have
heterogenous effects on countries with different levels of economic development. Among
the few, Baum and Caglayan (2009) and Caglayan and Di (2010) argue that exchange
rate uncertainty has little or no effect on export flows of either developed or develop-
ing countries. In contrast, Grier and Smallwood (2007), Arize et al. (2000) and Sauer
and Bohara (2001) conclude that the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on emerging
country exports is negative.
In this paper, we contribute to the existing literature in several distinct ways. First,
we exclusively investigate the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on emerging country
bilateral trade flows rather than those of developed economies. Second, we differentiate
the movements of trade flows between developing economies (South-South (S-S) trade) in
comparison to trade flows from developing to developed economies (South-North (S-N)
trade). Third, given the recent evidence that financial development significantly affects
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the pattern of international trade and economic growth, and that emerging countries
heavily depend on their exports for growth, we incorporate information on financial
depth of the exporting country in our analysis. In particular, we explore whether fi-
nancial depth, measured by the private credit to GDP ratio, mitigates the (potentially)
depressing impact of exchange rate uncertainty on developing countries’ trade flows.
Fourth, we implement a dynamic panel framework and consider the path dependency in
international trade flows using the system GMM approach. Last but not least, unlike
the previous research, which uses (mostly aggregated) total merchandize exports, we
scrutinize the behavior of (bilateral) manufactured goods exports.
We focus on the evolution of manufactures exports for several reasons. To start with,
it is widely recognized that “not all goods are alike in terms of their consequences for
economic performance” and the structure of trade matters for economic development
and growth (Hausmann et al. 2007, p.1). Manufactures exports are more likely to gen-
erate positive spill-overs (such as innovation and accumulation of physical and human
capital) and linkages for development (Feder 1983; Hausman et al. 2007). Also, the level
of (labor) productivity is much higher in manufacturing than in agriculture and services.
Since the manufacturing industry serves as a ‘hub’ for the generation and diffusion of new
technologies to the rest of the economy, they become the engine of export and economic
growth (Imbs and Wacziarg 2003). For instance, the median (mean) share of manufac-
tures exports in total merchandize exports of our sample of countries increased from
26% (32%) in 1980 to 53% (46%) in 1990, 62% (55%) in 2000, and 66% (60%) in 2005.
Furthermore, due to the higher price elasticity of manufactured goods exports demand
and higher degree of international product substitutability, manufactured goods exports
are likely to be more sensitive to exchange rate uncertainty. Finally, it is important to
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investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on emerging country manufactures
exports since these sectors depend heavily on external finance yet emerging economies
lack the adequate financial depth (Aghion et al. 2009).
To carry out our investigation, we estimate 28 separate dynamic panel models for
each of the emerging countries in our dataset and scrutinize their trade flows to the
rest of the world. Our investigation covers the period between 1978 and 2005. Several
findings emerge in a setting where confounding factors are considered within a dynamic
panel framework. First, we find that exchange rate uncertainty significantly affects trade
flows of (up to) 23 out of 28 countries, depending on the specified model. Although the
median effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows is negative, we find several
cases where the effect is positive. Furthermore, we provide evidence that exchange rate
uncertainty affects trade flows towards both South and North. However, in several cases,
we discover that the effect is unidirectional such that exchange rate uncertainty affects
trade flows towards either South or North. These results differ from the earlier research,
which showed that exports of emerging economies, to a large extent, are negatively
affected from exchange rate uncertainty. Second, we find that financial depth tends
to play a trade enhancing role. However, we also observe that the positive impact of
financial depth on trade flows can be reversed due to exchange rate shocks. Overall, we
find that the net effect of financial development on export growth is significant for up to
15 countries where the median effect is positive. Last but not least, we find evidence that
trade between emerging economies further enhances their manufactures export growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief literature
review. Section 3 introduces the model and describes the data. Section 4 discusses the
empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
5
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
In this study we address several different areas of research in international economics
including: i) the impact of exchange rate movements on trade flows; ii) the role of
financial depth in growth and trade; and iii) the determinants of S-S versus S-N trade.
In what follows below, we present a brief survey on each research area and point out
how our investigation links to that literature.
2.1 The Impact of Exchange Rate Uncertainty on Trade Flows
After the breakdown of Bretton-Woods agreement in 1973, it is argued that unexpected
movements in exchange rates—exchange rate volatility—would have adverse effects on
risk averse exporters. In particular, Ethier (1973), Cushman (1986) and Peree and
Steinherr (1989) show that an increase in exchange rate volatility will have adverse
effects on exports of risk averse firms. Contrarily, Franke (1991), and Sercu and Vanhulle
(1992) suggest that exchange rate volatility may have a positive impact on international
trade flows. Between these two positions, De Grauwe (1988), Viaene and DeVries (1992),
and Barkoulas et al. (2002) discuss the possibility of ambiguous effects of exchange rate
uncertainty on trade flows depending on the aggregate exposure to currency risk and
the type of shocks affecting the firms.
When we turn to empirical evidence, we cannot yet arrive at a clear conclusion
on the effects of exchange rate volatility on trade flows. Cushman (1983), Kenen and
Rodrik (1986), Thursby and Thursby (1987) and Peree and Steinherr (1989), among
others, report a nagative effect of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows, while Koray
and Lastrapes (1989), and Gagnon (1993) find insignificant effects. Likewise, Baum,
Caglayan and Ozkan (2004), and Baum and Caglayan (2010) show that exchange rate
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uncertainty has slightly positive but generally insignificant effects across countries. Klein
(1990), and Kroner and Lastrapes (1993), on the other hand, report both positive and
negative effects of exchange rate volatility on bilateral exports.
Overall, the studies above concentrate on data only from developed countries. Recent
research by Baum and Caglayan (2009) (using aggregate export flows from 16 developed
and 6 emerging countries), Caglayan and Di (2010) (using bilateral sectoral exports
from 9 developed and 5 emerging countries), and Grier and Smallwood (2007) (using
total merchandize exports from 9 developed and 9 emerging countries) investigate the
effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows of both developed and emerging
countries. While Grier and Smallwood (2007) conclude that the impact of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows of emerging economies is negative, the other two argue
that the effect is either insignificant or negligible. There are few exceptions where the
investigation is predominantly focused on emerging economies. Most notably, Arize et al.
(2000) (using quarterly aggregate exports from 13 developing countries) and Sauer and
Bohara (2001) (using annual aggregate exports from 22 developed and 69 developing
countries) show that exchange rate uncertainty has a significantly negative effect on
emerging country exports. Furthermore, Sauer and Bohara (2001) find that exchange
rate volatility significantly reduces exports from emerging economies in Latin America
and Africa, but not those in Asia or from industrialized countries.
In this study, different from earlier research we specifically concentrate on bilateral
manufactured goods exports from 28 emerging countries (representing 82% of all devel-
oping country manufactures exports) to the rest of the world. In addition, unlike most
previous research, we take into account the dynamic nature of the data with strong path
dependency using a panel framework.
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2.2 The Role of Financial Depth
Studies regarding the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows have neglected
the interrelations between uncertainty and financial development despite the growing
body of research pointing out the level of financial development as a source of compar-
ative advantage in international trade. According to research by Kletzer and Bardhan
(1987), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck (2002),
Braun and Larrain (2004), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005), and Demir and Dahi (2010),
industries and sectors that are more dependent on external finance grow faster in coun-
tries with better developed financial systems. In particular, developing countries (the
South) with low levels of financial development are found to have lower export shares
and trade balances in industries (such as manufactures) that depend more on exter-
nal finance. Given that industries with higher external finance needs also have larger
scales, higher research and development and value-added in production, it appears that
financial depth has significant implications for development and long term growth in the
South.
Naturally, the extent of financial development also determines the amount of credit
availability for international trade. Particularly, the lack of developed financial systems
increases the transaction costs and functions as a trade barrier if none of the trading
parties can provide the trade financing (UNCTAD 2005, 2007; IMF 2009). Further-
more, when domestic financial markets are underdeveloped, firms are more likely to
suffer from currency mismatch problems as adverse effects of exchange rate shocks are
further aggravated (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2004). In particular, Aghion et al.
(2009) present a theoretical model where real exchange rate uncertainty (by inducing
excess volatility in profits) exacerbates the negative investment effects of credit market
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constraints. As such, exchange rate volatility is expected to be more damaging to firms
that have high external finance dependency but located in countries with low levels of
financial development. Their empirical investigation shows that exchange rate volatility
reduces the productivity growth of manufacturing sectors that require higher liquidity
more in countries with lower financial depth.
Given the evidence discussed in the previous two sections, it is apparent that emerg-
ing countries face significant challenges due to exchange rate variability and financial
constraints in manufactured goods exports. Hence, it is important to investigate the ef-
fect of financial depth under exchange rate uncertainty on emerging country trade flows.
On the same theme, we also explore whether exchange rate uncertainty affects trade
growth more negatively in emerging countries where financial development is weaker.
2.3 The South-South Trade
Over the last two decades, the share of Southern exports in world trade increased sub-
stantially. Between 1978 and 2005 the share of the South in world manufactures exports
increased from 5% to 32% while that of S-S manufactures exports jumped from 2% to
16%. The annual growth rate of real S-S manufactures exports has also been signifi-
cantly higher than the world average reaching 14% as opposed to 5% for the latter. In
this respect, the S-S trade has long been seen as an untapped resource for emerging
economies. Myrdal (1956), for example, argued that regional integration in the South
could help emerging countries overcome local market size limitations during the pro-
cess of industrialization. It is proposed that given the strongly skill-biased structure of
output expansion in international trade (Antweiler and Trefler 2002), increasing mar-
ket size may help emerging countries enjoy scale effects and improve the skill content
of their exports. Likewise, Lewis (1980) and more recently UNCTAD (2005) suggest
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that S-S trade can reduce the dependence of the South on the expansion of developed
country economies—the North. Moreover, the structure of S-S trade is argued to have
dynamic and long term benefits for emerging countries both due to its comparatively
higher technology and human capital intensive factor content (Amsden 1980; Lall and
Ghosh 1989), and the presence of similarities in production patterns and resource base,
which facilitate appropriate technology transfers among Southern countries (Amsden
1987; UNIDO 2005; World Bank 2006).
Most of the theoretical research on exchange rates and S-S trade, including Eichen-
green and Bayoumi (1996), Eichengreen (1998), Mundell (2002), Bacha (2008), and
Swofford (2009) have focused on the optimal currency areas and Southern monetary
unions. Surprisingly, none of the studies on S-S trade investigate the relationship be-
tween exchange rate uncertainty and trade within developing economies or between
developing and developed countries. This presents an important gap in the literature
especially given the recent negotiations among various emerging countries to start using
national currencies for trade rather than hard Northern currencies (mostly dollar and
euro) to escape from the negative effects of currency fluctuations (see Stewart (1987)
for an earlier discussion on this issue). For example, Brazil and Argentina have recently
signed bilateral agreements towards using the peso or real in intra-Mercosur trade and
established futures markets for these local currencies (Phillips 2009). Similarly, in 2009,
Turkey signed a joint agreement with Russia and Iran to start using their national cur-
rencies instead of the dollar or euro for trade. Likewise, both Turkey and Russia are
reported getting ready for using national currencies in their trade with China as well.
The lack of research is also surprising given that exchange rate volatility is expected
to have deeper adverse effects on S-S trade (as opposed to S-N or N-N trade) due to
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the presence of low levels of financial market development, and high share of short term
liabilities in developing countries.
3 EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION
3.1 Modeling the Dynamics of Trade Flows
To investigate the effects of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows we construct 28
separate panels for each emerging country in our data set, and implement a dynamic
panel model. The inclusion of the lagged dependent variable into our specification allows
us to control for the persistence of changes in trade flows. Besides our modeling choice,
as discussed in section 2, we differ from the rest of the literature in several important
aspects. First, as we concentrate on the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade
flows of emerging countries, we also explore the differential effects of exchange rate
uncertainty on S-S trade vis-a`-vis S-N trade. Second, we test the effect of financial
development on trade flows under exchange rate shocks by including an interaction
variable between exchange rate uncertainty and financial depth. Third, we explore
whether S-S trade (versus S-N) has any differential effects on emerging country exports.
Our baseline model takes the following dynamic form:
xij,t = α0 + β1xij,t−1 + β2yj,t + β3si,t + β4σi,t−1 + β5Southj + (1)
+ β6(Southj × σi,t−1) + Vj,t + νi + i,t
where xij,t, yj,t denote the log difference of real manufactures exports from country i to
j at time t, and the logarithmic real per capita income growth of the importing country,
respectively. The log difference in annual average effective real exchange rate of country
i is represented by si,t. Given that the trade data are annual and that the exchange rate
uncertainty is generally shown to achieve its greatest effect on trade within a year, we
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construct an uncertainty proxy that incorporates monthly variations in exchange rates
up to a year and denote it with σi,t−1 (Baum et al. 2004). South is a dummy variable
set to 1 if the importing country is a developing economy, and 0 otherwise. Vj depict
our control variables including the log of population and a measure of urbanization of
the trading partners (for data definitions and sources, please refer to the appendix). In
this model the exchange rate uncertainty enters into the equation on its own and in
interaction with the South dummy. The interaction term allows us to test if uncertainty
affects S-S trade different from S-N trade.
Next, we augment our baseline model with a measure of financial depth, Credit,
to test its importance for trade growth under exchange rate shocks. In particular, we
implement two separate models. In the first case we allow Credit to enter the model on
its own and in interaction with uncertainty so that we can test if financial depth could
mitigate or worsen any adverse effects of exchange rate uncertainty on emerging country
trade flows. The model that we estimate takes the form:
xij,t = α0 + β1xij,t−1 + β2yj,t + β3si,t + β4σi,t−1 + β5Southj
+ β6(Southj × σi,t−1) + β7Crediti,t + β8(Crediti,t × σi,t−1) (2)
+ Vj,t + νi + i,t
where the rest of the elements of the model is the same as in Equation (1). We then
allow Credit to have a separate effect on trade with South by introducing two additional
interactions; Credit× South and Credit× South× σ as shown below:
xij,t = α0 + β1xij,t−1 + β2yj,t + β3si,t + β4σi,t−1 + β5Southj + β6(Southj × σi,t−1)
+ β7Crediti,t + β8(Crediti,t × Southj) + β9(Crediti,t × σi,t−1) (3)
+ β10(Crediti,t × Southj × σi,t−1) + Vj,t + νi + i,t
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Differing from Equation (2), Equation (3) allows us to investigate the impact of credit
depth when the country is trading with the North and South separately. Furthermore,
we can explore whether exchange rate uncertainty can annul or even negate the total
effect of credit depth on trade flows. Likewise, we can study if the impact of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows to North and South is mitigated or aggravated as we
incorporate financial depth into the model.
3.2 Data
We carry out our empirical investigation using annual aggregate real manufactures ex-
ports data (ISIC 5-8) from 28 emerging countries, which account for 82% of all developing
country manufactures exports to the rest of the world (126-226 countries), and 76% of
all S-S exports during 1978-2005. Over the period of investigation, we observe a steady
increase in the sample countries’ share in global manufactures exports going up from
4% in 1978 to 29% in 2005. Our investigation ends in 2005 because of data availability
issues for most of the countries in our dataset.
The data on manufactured good exports are obtained from the U.N. Commodity
Trade Statistics Database (COMTRADE). Our dataset spans the period 1978 to 2005,
and includes 11 countries from Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela), 7 countries from
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey), and 10 countries from East and South East Asia (China, Hong Kong,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand).
While choosing these countries in our data set we made sure that each country has:
a) the presence of a sufficiently diversified production and export structure, b) at least
10 years of continuous data (to avoid non-random entry and exit bias), and c) regional
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representation to avoid sampling bias (for example, Sauer and Bohara (2001) find that
exchange rate uncertainty is significant in Latin America and Africa but not in Asia).
In addition to our key questions of interest, the country sample also allows us to discuss
the role of geographical location or the impact of development on the role of exchange
rate movements in trade growth.
We extract consumer price indices and spot foreign exchange rates from the IMFs
International Financial Statistics (IFS). The effective real exchange rate, also obtained
from the IFS, is based on trade weights. In a few cases including for Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, Turkey and Uruguay, exchange rate data
are gathered from the Bank for International Settlements, domestic statistical institutes,
and central banks. When the multilateral rate is not available it is computed from the
spot exchange rate and local and US consumer price indices for Egypt, India, Indonesia,
Jordan, Syria, and Thailand. The effective real exchange rate is expressed as an index
with 2005 as the base year and an increase is a real appreciation. The export data are
expressed in current US dollars and we employ country specific export price deflators
(from WDI) to generate real exports.
We use the ratio of real private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
intermediaries to real GDP, Credit, as a proxy for financial development. This proxy,
used by several researchers including Beck et al. (2000), Levine et al. (2000), Beck
(2002), Svalery and Vlachos (2005) and Braun and Raddatz (2007), captures the extent
of financial development of the exporting country, and is considered the most standard
measure of financial development.
In our investigation the North includes high-income OECD countries while the South
includes all low and middle income countries according to the World Bank definitions.
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Finally, in order to limit the impact of outliers, we dropped those observations of real
exports (in levels) that were below the 1st percentile, and real export growth rates
that were below or above the 1st and 99th percentiles. This restriction leads to only a
marginal reduction in sample size (i.e. 2.4% on average). Regression results when we
use the full data are similar to those reported in the text and are available upon request.
In Tables 1 and 2 we provide summary statistics on the variables that enter the
analysis. We can see from Table 1 that the average annual total real export growth is
quite high for many countries and falls between 3.22 (Venezuela) and 23.38 (Indonesia).
For the case of Syria the growth rate is negative and can be explained by the existing
trade sanctions. When we look at the growth rate of trade flows to the South the figures
are slightly higher; the growth rate of real exports falls between 4.46 (Venezuela) and
24.24 (Indonesia). The same figures for North are between 0.55 (Argentina) and 24.68
(China). For a number of countries, namely Algeria, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela,
trade growth with North is negative over this period. Average total trade growth for
all countries is 11%, and with the South it is 11.3%. The last column shows that the
number of trade partners for each country ranges between 126 and 226.
In Table 2, we provide further information on other variables that enter into our
model. Column 1 shows that the average manufactures exports to GDP ratio range
between 0.5% (Algeria) and 94.7% (Singapore). Column 2 presents the average ratio
of manufactures exports to total merchandize exports. For some countries this ratio
is very small such as Ecuador (1.2%), Algeria (2.0%) while for some others it is quite
high such as Hong Kong (84.1%), South Korea (82.9%) and China (80.5%). The next
two columns present the average percentage share of manufactures exports that goes
to South and North separately. These ratios are generally balanced except for Mexico
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whose 91.9% of trade is with the North given that 88% of its exports go to the US
alone. Column 5 provides real GDP per capita (in PPP terms) where Hong Kong and
Singapore stand out from the rest of the countries with their GDP per capita levels
of around $21,000. Column 6 depicts credit depth in each country allowing us to see
that there is substantial variation across countries. We see that for only a handful
of countries the ratio of private credit to real GDP is above 50%, including China,
Hong Kong, Jordan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand and Tunisia. Column
7 depicts our measure of exchange rate uncertainty which differs substantially from
country to country. Given the country heterogeneity, we expect to find that exchange
rate uncertainty affects their trade flows differently. In the last two columns we provide
information on population and urbanization, reflecting market size, and the degree of
urban versus agrarian development.
3.2.1 Generating Exchange Rate Uncertainty
The empirical literature offers a number of competing approaches for the construction
of the exchange rate volatility measure including methods such as the simple moving
standard deviation of the series. However, this proxy gives rise to substantial serial
correlation in the measure. In this study we implement the GARCH model to capture
the volatility clustering often found in exchange rate series. Prior to estimation of the
GARCH model, we scrutinize the time series properties of the data to determine the
appropriate characterization regarding the order of integration of each exchange rate
series. We find that GARCH (1,1) provides a good fit for the monthly exchange rate
data for all countries in the sample. Given the presence of unit root in the real exchange
rate series we computed the GARCH model for each country in our dataset on the log
difference of monthly real exchange rate series and used their annual averages in the
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regressions as our measure of exchange rate uncertainty. Ideally, it would be preferable
to generate a measure of uncertainty based on bilateral real exchange rates for each
of the trading parters of the sample countries. However, this was not feasible because
of data unavailability as it required monthly bilateral exchange rates and price indexes
going back to 1978. Regression results from the GARCH models are available upon
request.
4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Throughout our empirical implementation, we employ the two-step system GMM dy-
namic panel data estimator by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998),
and use the second to fourth lags of variables as instruments. We limited the number of
instruments given that remote lags are not likely to provide much additional information
and that the power of overidentification test is weakened as instrument count increases
relative to the sample size (Roodman, 2009). Using the system GMM method we aim
to control for any possible parameter endogeneity, state-dependence, and simultaneity
bias as well as to correct for the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and
firm specific effects and the error term. We compute robust two-step standard errors
by the Windmeijer finite-sample correction method. The reliability of our econometric
methodology depends crucially on the validity of the instruments, which can be evalu-
ated with the J test of overidentifying restrictions. A rejection of the null hypothesis
that instruments are orthogonal to errors would indicate that the estimates are not
consistent. Given that the model we implement has a dynamic panel data context, we
expect the presence of a first order serial correlation. However, we should not detect a
second-order serial correlation so that the instruments are not correlated with the errors.
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For each model we check, the J statistic for overidentifying restrictions and the Arellano
and Bond AR(2) tests and make sure that our instruments are appropriate and there is
no second order serial correlation.
4.1 Basic Specification
In this section we first discuss results obtained for equation (1) where we allow trade flows
to follow a dynamic framework. Using this model, we investigate the effects of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows originating from emerging economies to the rest of the
world and discuss its impact on exports to South and North separately. Within this
framework we also scrutinize if S-S trade has any trade enhancing or impeding effect on
emerging countries. Given that we run separate panels for each of the countries in our
dataset (28 in total), in Table 3 we provide qualitative information (the sign and the
significance) on the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on exports to North and South
as well as on the importance of trade with South for export growth (the details of all
regressions results are available upon request). Also, Table 3 as well as Tables 4 and 5
contain information on the number of instruments used, number of trading partners in
each model,and number of observations.
Inspecting Table 3 we see that exchange rate uncertainty significantly affects trade
flows of 18 out of 28 countries—the effect is significant and negative for Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Turkey, India, Pakistan, Philippines, and South Korea; and
positive for Syria, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela, Indonesia, and
Singapore. Considering all countries, we observe that the median impact of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows is negative. When we explore the effect of uncertainty
on trade flows towards South, we find that the median impact is still negative (eight
negative versus four positive cases) but that towards North is positive (seven positive
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versus five negative cases). Furthermore, inspecting columns one and two we can see that
the effect of uncertainty on trade flows for some countries is only in one direction, S-N
or S-S, yet there are a few countries where exchange rate uncertainty affects trade flows
in both directions. These findings suggest that the effects of exchange rate uncertainty
on developing country exports may very well depend on the direction of trade, that is
S-S versus S-N. Overall, while the results provide a general support to the claim that
trade flows emanating from emerging countries are negatively effected by exchange rate
uncertainty, the evidence is not as strong as earlier research suggests (see, for example,
Arize et al. 2000, and Sauer and Bohara, 2001).
The third column of Table 3 allows us to scrutinize whether S-S trade enhances or
mitigates exports of an emerging economy. Note that this is a joint test of the hypothesis
that (β5 + β6 × σi,t−1) is significantly different from zero at the mean value of exchange
rate uncertainty. If the effect is insignificant (none), then trade with South has a similar
impact to that of North on export growth. If the effect is positive (negative), then
we can say that trade with South enhances (impedes) trade growth of the exporting
country. Inspecting column three, we see that S-S trade further enhances trade growth
of 11 emerging economies. Only one country, Singapore, experiences a reduction in its
trade growth as she trades with the South. This, however, is because of the presence of a
strong negative effect of exchange rate uncertainty that the interaction term (β6×σi,t−1)
captures. Hence, the case of Singapore (as well as Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Philippines,
and South Korea, in column two) shows that exchange rate shocks can significantly
reduce S-S trade growth. To overcome such negative effects, emerging countries are
currently beginning to use their own currencies rather than a hard currency when they
trade with each other. As noted in section 2.1, this is being observed between several
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emerging countries.
Should we look at the importance of trade with the South for emerging economies
from a regional stand point, we observe significant positive effects for almost all East
and South East Asian countries including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, South
Korea, and Thailand, which are considered as the engine of growth in the world economy.
Similarly, for the Latin American countries positive effects of trade with South are
reported for Argentina, Brazil, and Columbia. In the case of MENA, the two largest
NICs, Egypt and Turkey both display a positive trade response to S-S trade. For the
remaining countries, we observe that trade with South under exchange rate uncertainty
does not have an additional impact on their trade growth. These findings provide partial
support to the view that trade with South can further enhance growth patterns of
emerging countries as suggested by several researchers that we discuss in section 2.
4.2 Augmenting the Model with Financial Depth
We next augment our basic model by introducing a control variable on the level of
financial development (Credit) of the exporting country. Here we examine two different
models. In the first case, different from Equation (1), we introduce Credit on its own and
in conjunction with exchange rate uncertainty as depicted in Equation (2). In our final
model, we allow the affect of Credit to differ between South and North by interacting
these two terms with South as shown in Equation (3). These models allow us to test
the claim that financial depth would have a mitigating impact on the linkages between
exchange rate uncertainty and trade flows as Aghion et al. (2009) suggests. Additionally,
we investigate if financial depth enhances trade growth.
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4.2.1 Case 1: The Role of Financial Depth
Table 4 depicts the results for Equation (2) where we augment our basic model with
Credit and the interaction of Credit with exchange rate uncertainty. Inspecting columns
1 and 2 we see that exchange rate uncertainty affects trade flows of 17 out of 28 countries.
Specifically, we find that the median effect is negative (8 out of 13 cases) for S-S trade.
In the case of S-N trade we encounter equal number of negative and positive (7 versus
7) cases. Of the 17 cases, seven countries respond to exchange rate uncertainty only
in one direction—three negative cases for S-S, and two positive and two negative cases
for S-N—and the rest responds in both directions (five positive and five negative cases).
Interestingly, we do not find any strong evidence that financial depth mitigates the
total impact of uncertainty on trade flows. Nevertheless, this observation does not
necessarily indicate a lack of significance of financial development for trade flows of
emerging economies.
Column 3 presents the total impact of Credit on trade growth. To determine the
overall effect of credit on trade flows we test the joint hypothesis that (β7 + β8 × σi,t−1)
is equal to zero at the mean value of exchange rate uncertainty (σi,t−1). We find that
the total effect is positive for 6 countries including Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Philip-
pines, Syria, and Venezuela. Surprisingly, the effect is negative for 7 countries including
Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Morocco, Singapore, South Korea, and Turkey. When we
step back and consider the sign and the size of the interaction term between Credit
and exchange rate uncertainty, we observe that the total impact of these countries yield
a negative sign due to the presence of a large negative coefficient on the interaction
term. This shows that exchange rate shocks can annul or negate the positive effects of
financial depth on export growth. In other words, a large negative coefficient on the
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interaction term negates the effects of financial depth on trade flows. These findings
can be explained by the changes in long term business structure of companies that en-
gage in trade, which later reflects on their export patterns as countries experience large
shocks rather than a lack of finance. For instance the significant downturn in trade
flows in 2008-2009 are explained by “falling demand rather than a lack of trade finance”
according to IMF (2009 p.8).
Finally, we concentrate on the impact of trade with South. Similar to our findings
in the benchmark model, we see that trade with South has significant export enhancing
effects for emerging economies. We now find that there are 11 cases where trade with
South has a significantly positive effect on export growth. There are two countries
(Singapore and Syria) whose overall trade growth is negatively affected as they trade
with the South. As in the previous case (see the discussion for the role of trade flows to
South for results in Table 3) the effect of S-S trade is negative for Singapore due to the
presence of a negative exchange rate shock.
4.2.2 Case 2: The Role of Financial Depth for North and South
Table 5 depicts our results for Equation (3) where we differentiate the total effects of
real exchange rate uncertainty and financial depth on trade flows towards North and
South. We start our investigation inspecting the impact of exchange rate uncertainty
on trade flows. Looking at Columns 1 and 2, we see that exchange rate uncertainty
affects exports of 19 (12 negative and 7 positive) out of 28 countries including Egypt,
Jordan, Syria, Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay,
Venezuela, China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.
Similar to Tables 3 and 4, for few countries uncertainty affects trade flows to North and
South at the same time (three positive, three negative, and one with opposite signs)
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while in others the effect is either for North (four negative, three positive) or South
(four negative, two positive). When we consider S-S and S-N trade, we find that the
median effect is negative; for the S-S trade there are 8 negative versus 4 positive cases
and for the S-N trade there are 7 negative versus 6 positive cases. Similar to our earlier
observations, we do not find that financial depth mitigates the adverse effects of exchange
rate uncertainty on trade flows. Furthermore, exchange rate uncertainty seems to have
a broader impact on trade flows of emerging economies in comparison to that shown in
Tables 3 and 4, and the effect is negative for both S-S and S-N trade flows.
Turning to the effect of financial development, in Columns 3 and 4, we provide
information on the effect of Credit on trade flows when the country is trading with the
North or South. To determine the effect of financial depth on trade with the North and
South we test the significance of (β7 + β9× σi,t−1) and (β7 + β8× Southj + β9× σi,t−1 +
β10 × Southj × σi,t−1) at the mean value of exchange rate uncertainty. Overall we find
that there are 15 significant cases where trade credit is having an impact on trade flows
(for one country the effect is in opposite directions for S-S and S-N trade). Of these 15
cases, 9 countries experience a positive impact on their trade growth as financial depth
increases, yet 7 countries experience a negative effect. In particular, Column (3) shows
that the total effect of financial depth on trade with North enhances trade for 8 countries
(Syria, Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico, Paraguay, China, and Philippines) yet for
5 countries (Morocco, Turkey, Columbia, Indonesia and Singapore) we find that it leads
to a reduction in export growth. Column (4) provides the overall effect of Credit on
trade flows towards South and shows that only 3 countries (Indonesia, Mexico, and South
Korea) experience a reduction in their exports whereas 5 countries (Syria, Argentina,
Brazil, Philippines and Venezuela) enjoy an increase in their export growth. Here, too,
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the negative effects of financial depth on trade flow is mostly a consequence of adverse
exchange rate shocks which is captured by the interaction terms. It is also possible
that the adverse effects of exchange rate uncertainty is exacerbated due to the existence
of intermediate levels of financial development in those emerging countries rather than
fully operational financial markets. As shocks alter the long term business structure of
exporting companies and affect the consumer demand, semi-developed financial markets
may not be sufficient to reverse the adverse impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade
flows.
The last column of Table 5 depicts the impact of South on trade flows. Similar to
our findings in the previous models, we find that S-S trade has a trade enhancing effect
for emerging economies. We find that there are 12 cases where trade South significantly
affects export growth. For 10 countries (Turkey, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, South Korea and Thailand) the effect is positive and
for 2 countries (Syria and Mexico) the effect is negative (Singapore dropped from our
list due to the presence of a strong multi-collinearity problem). Of the negative cases,
Mexico’s results from a strongly negative interaction of uncertainty with a positive S-S
effect. The negative effect for Syria can possibly be explained by the presence of regional
preferential trade agreements between Syria and other Arab states in the Middle East
that cause trade diversion.
4.2.3 Robustness Tests
To check for the robustness of our findings, we repeat the analysis presented in Tables
3-5 using a further lagged uncertainty measure to capture the effect of variations in
exchange rates between the 12th and the 24th months rather than in the first 12 months.
In general our results are similar to those reported in the text, yet we find that a slightly
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smaller (and different) set of countries are effected by exchange rate uncertainty. These
observations are meaningful as it is possible that exchange volatility can take more than
a year to affect trade flows for some countries while for some others the impact could
be observed more quickly. Hence, the results from this set of regressions that take into
account any delayed effects of exchange rate volatility along with our earlier findings
provide a stronger support for the significant effects of exchange rate uncertainty on
trade flows. In total, we see that there are 23 countries (out of 28) where exchange
rate uncertainty has a significant effect on trade flows in at least one direction—South
or North. Though there are cases where the effect is positive, the median effect of
exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows is negative in both S-N and S-S trade.
When we turn to the impact of financial depth on short term trade growth, we came
up with similar conclusions that financial depth has mixed impact on trade flows. We
find that the net effect is positive for a total of 9 countries in S-N trade and 7 countries
in S-S trade. Yet, there are several countries where the total impact of financial depth is
found to be negative. Similar to previous results, this mostly results from a significantly
negative interaction term with uncertainty. The other cases where the coefficient of
Credit assumes a negative sign may be explained by the fact that financial markets in
these countries have not matured sufficiently. The reason why we find mixed and not
very strong results may also be due to the fact that the financial depth measure we use
is too broad and therefore we cannot capture the full impact of credit provided to firms
involved in international trade. But overall it is the negative exchange rate shocks, which
cannot be absorbed fully by the financial markets that render the coefficient of Credit
negative. Last but not least, we observe that international trade between emerging
markets appear to be enhancing growth and results are similar to those in Tables 3-5.
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5 CONCLUSION
In this paper we investigate the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on trade flows of
28 emerging economies taking into account the role of financial depth, and the extent of
industrialization of their trade partners; North versus South. We construct 28 separate
panels for trade flows emanating from each emerging country in our dataset to the rest of
the world. Each panel spans the period during 1978-2005. Using GARCH methodology,
we compute country specific measures of exchange rate uncertainty. We use the ratio
of real private credit by deposit money banks and other financial intermediaries to real
GDP as a proxy for financial depth. All models are estimated by the system GMM
method.
Our investigation shows that exchange rate uncertainty has a significant impact on
trade flows of emerging countries. However, our results differ from the earlier research
which conclude that exchange rate uncertainty mainly has a negative impact on trade
flows of developing countries. We find that although the impact of exchange rate un-
certainty on trade flows can be positive, the median effect is negative for trade flows
to both North and South. In addition, we also find that in several cases uncertainty
affects trade flows only in one direction, S-S or S-N. Furthermore, the adverse effects of
exchange rate uncertainty are not necessarily mitigated by financial depth.
When we turn to inspect the overall impact of financial depth on trade flows, we
find that for several countries the effect is positive while there are a few cases where the
effect is negative. We observe that the negative effect is mainly due to the presence of
strong exchange rate shocks that affect the country. Yet, it would be useful to further
investigate the role of financial depth on trade flows and how it interacts with exchange
rate volatility using more disaggregated data. Finally, when we investigate whether S-S
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trade, compared to S-N trade promote manufactured good trade for emerging coun-
tries, we find evidence that trade among emerging economies enhances export growth
significantly for our sample of countries. Hence, different from the presumption that
emerging countries enjoy growth in their exports as they interact more with the North,
we provide empirical evidence that trade among emerging countries can promote further
trade growth in these economies. Further empirical investigation using other emerging
countries would be useful to understand if trade between developing countries promotes
more trade, or whether our findings are limited with only emerging countries at higher
levels of industrial development.
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Appendix
Data Definitions and Sources
Exports: The bilateral manufactures exports data are extracted from COMTRADE
(and OECD for Turkey). Total merchandize exports series are from WDI database. All
raw data are in current U.S. dollars. In converting to real values we used exports price
indices (i.e. unit values of aggregate or manufactures exports depending on availabil-
ity) from IFS, WDI, and the central bank and statistical institutes of South Korea and
Turkey.
Exchange rates: The real effective and nominal exchange rates are extracted from IFS,
and BIS, and domestic central bank and statistics institutes.
Per capita real GDP: They are extracted from WDI in constant international 2005 prices.
Credit: Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share
of GDP. Given the inconsistency between a stock and flow ratio, it is calculated using
the following deflation method as in Beck (2002): 100*
0.5∗[Creditt
Pet
+
Creditt−1
Pet−1 ]
GDPt/Pat
where Credit
is private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions to the private
sector, Pe is end-of period CPI and Pa is average annual CPI, and GDP is in local
currency. Raw data are extracted from the electronic version of the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics (IFS).
Population and Urbanization rates (POP and Urban) are extracted from WDI.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Real Export Growth (%)
Total North South Number of Obs Dates
Partners
Algeria 8.43 -2.33 14.95 126 775 80-04
Argentina 4.14 0.55 5.30 194 2,138 80-05
Bolivia 10.16 9.94 10.33 124 911 80-05
Brazil 7.35 5.18 7.72 219 3,463 83-05
Chile 8.65 15.01 6.36 187 1,823 83-05
China 20.68 24.68 20.06 214 3,338 87-05
Colombia 8.70 5.84 9.50 215 2,650 78-05
Costa Rica 11.58 19.61 8.72 154 1,362 86-05
Ecuador 9.58 11.58 8.51 156 1,290 80-05
Egypt 13.27 9.28 14.35 194 2,483 81-05
Hong Kong 7.36 9.40 7.02 201 4,317 78-05
India 13.22 10.19 13.70 224 4,608 78-05
Indonesia 23.38 19.39 24.24 217 3,083 79-05
Jordan 10.74 11.84 7.67 167 1,861 81-05
Malaysia 16.88 13.05 17.56 225 3,947 78-05
Mexico 12.12 11.28 12.32 217 2,370 86-05
Morocco 13.31 11.99 13.56 183 2,495 78-05
Pakistan 12.06 9.80 12.48 213 3,405 82-05
Paraguay 4.66 -3.11 9.65 115 777 83-05
Philippines 7.77 6.31 8.13 210 2,983 80-05
Singapore 9.90 12.28 9.38 220 3,266 79-05
South Korea 14.71 11.98 15.15 226 4,386 78-05
Syria -4.25 4.35 -7.64 145 516 95-05
Thailand 18.72 14.44 19.47 223 4,254 78-05
Tunisia 10.60 9.67 10.90 184 2,148 80-05
Turkey 22.45 22.23 22.52 219 3,382 78-05
Uruguay 7.48 -0.22 10.88 169 1,572 83-05
Venezuela 3.22 -0.36 4.46 161 1,692 83-05
Note:Total, North and South refer to the real export growth of sample countries to the world, North,
and South, respectively. Number of partners refer to the number of trading partners in the sample.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
X/GDP X/Trade N/X S/X RGDPC Credit σ Pop Urban
Algeria 0.5 2.0 58.4 41.6 5,517 31.8 0.0010 26 53.5
Argentina 3.1 28.8 35.1 64.9 10,160 16.5 0.0114 34 87.6
Bolivia 4.0 25.7 76.6 23.4 2,753 32.3 0.0347 7 56.4
Brazil 4.9 52.8 55.6 44.4 6,880 49.2 0.0028 159 77.2
Chile 9.7 39.6 62.6 37.4 8,950 57.7 0.0005 14 84.5
China 16.9 80.5 47.6 52.4 2,980 98.8 0.0012 1,210 32.4
Colombia 3.3 26.6 39.2 60.8 5,430 27.6 0.0007 34 68.3
Costa Rica 11.9 38.1 53.9 46.1 7,265 17.9 0.0002 4 55.2
Ecuador 1.2 5.3 23.7 76.3 4,553 22.2 0.0024 11 55.9
Egypt 2.1 28.9 57.3 42.7 3,608 38.1 0.0027 59 43.2
Hong Kong 89.8 84.1 53.0 47.0 21,675 147.7 0.0002 6 97.1
India 4.7 64.6 54.3 45.7 1,944 24.6 0.0003 875 25.8
Indonesia 9.5 33.7 52.7 47.3 3,071 28.1 0.003* 183 33.5
Jordan 10.2 44.2 21.1 78.9 4,128 66.7 0.0003 4 73.2
Malaysia 42.5 53.2 58.2 41.8 7,773 95.3 0.0004 19 52.8
Mexico 15.1 66.1 91.9 8.1 7,275 18.7 0.0013 91 73.2
Morocco 7.8 45.9 65.7 34.3 3,534 35.3 0.0002 25 48.6
Pakistan 9.4 72.9 63.0 37.0 2,254 23.3 0.0003 119 31.5
Paraguay 1.7 12.5 44.6 55.4 5,029 20.3 0.0018 5 51.3
Philippines 17.4 52.8 72.4 27.6 3,331 34.1 0.0008 65 50.9
Singapore 94.7 65.8 48.5 51.5 20,970 98.7 0.0001 3 100.0
South Korea 24.1 82.9 58.7 41.3 10,405 62.3 0.0005 43 71.5
Syria 2.5 9.0 28.0 72.0 1,999 9.2 0.0006 17 51.6
Thailand 20.4 54.5 60.7 39.3 4,888 84.1 0.0004 55 29.4
Tunisia 16.4 56.9 74.6 25.4 5,653 60.0 0.0002 8 58.9
Turkey 6.3 61.9 62.9 37.1 4,727 15.4 0.0013 58 57.6
Uruguay 6.2 41.2 33.4 66.6 9,036 33.6 0.0010 3 89.8
Venezuela 3.7 13.8 56.5 43.5 7,571 24.4 0.0064 22 86.5
Note: X/GDP and X/Trade refer to the share of manufactures exports in GDP and total merchandise
exports of country i, N/X and S/X refer to the share of manufactures exports to the North and South in
total manufactures exports, respectively. RGDPC is average real GDP per capita in 2005 international
prices for the period analyzed for country i, Credit is the share of real private credit by deposit money
banks and other financial institutions to real GDP, Sigma is the exchange rate uncertainty, POP is
total population in millions, Urban is the percentage share of urban population.
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Table 3: Basic Model: Effects of Exchange Rate Uncertainty
MENA Countries
σNorth σSouth South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
Algeria none none none 46 69/545
Egypt neg*** neg*** pos*** 70 154/2048
Jordan none none none 71 127/1525
Morocco none none none 56 134/2018
Syria pos*** pos*** none 33 90/348
Tunisia none none none 73 125/1751
Turkey neg** none pos* 80 180/2875
Latin American Countries
σNorth σSouth South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
Argentina none none pos** 93 180/1815
Bolivia none none none 73 64/775
Brazil none neg*** pos*** 64 177/2942
Chile none neg** none 81 126/1535
Colombia none neg** pos*** 56 137/2140
Costa Rica pos* none none 36 97/1128
Ecuador neg** neg* none 52 94/1062
Mexico pos*** none none 52 153/1936
Paraguay pos** none none 46 57/652
Uruguay none pos* none 83 115/1308
Venezuela pos* pos** none 67 112/1410
East and South East Asian Countries
σNorth σSouth South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
China none none none 42 186/2825
Hong Kong none none none 56 177/3777
India neg*** none pos*** 101 185/3804
Indonesia pos*** pos*** pos** 92 185/2601
Malaysia none none pos*** 50 183/3278
Pakistan neg** neg*** pos** 48 172/2905
Philippines none neg** none 79 164/2470
Singapore pos* none neg* 53 178/2742
South Korea none neg* pos* 52 184/3709
Thailand none none pos*** 52 182/3588
Note: σNorth and σSouth refer to the joint effect of exchange rate uncertainty on S-N and S-S trade,
respectively. South refer to the joint effect of S-S trade. # of Inst. and # of Groups/Obs refer to the
number of instruments, and the number of groups and observations in each estimation. * p < 0.10, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: The Role of Financial Depth
MENA Countries
σNorth σSouth Credit(tot) South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
Algeria none none none none 48 69/545
Egypt neg*** neg*** none pos*** 72 154/2048
Jordan none none none none 73 127/1525
Morocco none none neg* none 58 134/2018
Syria pos** pos* pos*** neg* 35 90/348
Tunisia none none none none 75 125/1751
Turkey neg*** none neg** pos* 82 180/2875
Latin American Countries
σNorth σSouth Credit(tot) South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
Argentina pos** none pos*** pos** 95 130/1815
Bolivia none none none none 75 64/775
Brazil none neg** pos*** pos*** 66 177/2942
Chile none neg** none none 83 126/1535
Colombia none neg* neg* pos*** 58 137/2140
Costa Rica pos* none none none 38 97/1128
Ecuador neg* neg* none none 54 94/1062
Mexico none none neg** none 54 153/1936
Paraguay pos** pos* pos* none 48 57/652
Uruguay none none none none 85 115/1308
Venezuela pos* pos* pos** none 69 112/1410
East and South East Asian Countries
σNorth σSouth Credit(tot) South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
China neg*** neg** none none 44 186/2825
Hong Kong neg* none none none 39 177/2328
India neg*** neg* none pos*** 103 185/3804
Indonesia pos** pos*** neg* pos** 94 185/2601
Malaysia none none none pos*** 52 183/3278
Pakistan neg*** neg*** none pos*** 50 172/2905
Philippines none none pos*** none 81 164/2470
Singapore pos** pos* neg*** neg* 55 178/2742
South Korea none none neg** pos* 54 184/3709
Thailand none none none pos*** 54 182/3588
Note:Credit(tot) refers to the joint effect of Credit. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For other
variable definitions please refer to Table 3.
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Table 5: The Role of Financial Depth for Trade with North and South
MENA Countries
σN σS Credit(Ntot) Credit(Stot) South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
Algeria none none none none none 50 69/545
Egypt neg*** neg** none none none 74 154/2048
Jordan none neg* none none none 75 127/1525
Morocco none none neg*** none none 60 134/2018
Syria none pos** pos** pos** neg* 37 90/348
Tunisia none none none none none 77 125/1751
Turkey neg*** none neg*** none pos* 84 180/2875
Latin American Countries
σN σS Credit(Ntot) Credit(Stot) South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
Argentina pos*** none pos** pos** pos** 97 130/1815
Bolivia none none none none none 77 64/775
Brazil none neg** pos** pos*** pos*** 68 177/2942
Chile none neg* none none none 85 126/1535
Colombia none neg** neg* none pos*** 60 137/2140
Costa Rika none none pos** none pos** 40 97/1128
Ecuador neg* none none none none 56 94/1062
Mexico pos** neg* pos* neg*** neg** 56 153/1936
Paraguay pos*** pos* pos** none none 50 57/652
Uruguay none none none none none 87 115/1308
Venezuela none pos** none pos*** none 71 112/1410
East and South East Asian Countries
σN σS Cerdit(Ntot) Credit(Stot) South # of Inst. # of Groups/Obs
China neg*** neg** pos** none none 46 186/2825
Hong Kong none none none none none 41 177/2328
India neg*** none none none pos*** 105 185/3804
Indonesia pos** pos* neg* neg* none 96 185/2601
Malaysia none none none none pos** 54 183/3278
Pakistan neg*** neg*** none none pos*** 52 172/2905
Philippines pos* none pos*** pos** none 83 164/2470
Singapore pos** absent neg*** absent absent 57 178/2742
South Korea none none none neg** pos** 56 184/3709
Thailand neg* none none none pos*** 56 182/3588
Note:Credit(Ntot) and Credit(Stot) refer to the joint effect of Credit on S-N and S-S trade, respectively.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. For other variable definitions please refer to Table 3.
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